Eight Recommendations in Priority Order

Formally acknowledge that 67.6% of committed funds in jobs-critical IDA Global Practices did not achieve Satisfactory outcomes (FY2015–2025). Set time-bound S+ improvement targets tracked through the IDA21 MTR, framed in both project-count and committed-dollar terms. Without a formal baseline acknowledgement, there is no starting point for accountability.

What it requires: Management statement at FCV Strategy launch quantifying the delivery gap. IDA21 MTR scorecard includes S+ rate by GP in IDA and FCS.

Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation (FCI) — the GP responsible for the MSME agenda at the heart of the strategy — achieved 23.8% S+ in IDA and 18.8% S+ in IDA+FCS countries. Scaling FCI FCS targets should be conditional on explicit Quality at Entry improvement benchmarks and accountability mechanisms, not set parallel to them. A QAG-equivalent review of FCS Quality at Entry should be established before scaling targets are confirmed.

What it requires: FCI scaling targets conditional on measurable QaE improvement. Annual S+ reporting by GP in IDA and FCS contexts published alongside IDA21 portfolio reports.

IFC’s FCS investment outcome rate stood at 11% Satisfactory (CY2020–22). In the same cohort, IFC realised its anticipated additionality in only 33% of FCS investment projects. Publish annual IFC development outcome rates disaggregated by FCS country tier and instrument type. Make further FCS scaling conditional on measurable improvement from this baseline. The strategy should not proceed with scaling ambitions until the baseline is publicly established.

What it requires: Annual public disclosure of IFC development outcome rates by FCS tier, instrument, and industry group. Minimum two consecutive years of documented improvement before scaling targets are binding.

Confirm that each billion deployed through the Private Sector Window is generating net increases in IFC FCS commitments, not substituting own-account activity. IDA18–20 evidence shows non-PSW IFC commitments in PSW-eligible countries fell in aggregate. IDA21’s reduced Board visibility through the wholesale governance model makes an independent additionality verification mechanism more, not less, important.

What it requires: Independent annual PSW additionality assessment published within 6 months of each fiscal year close. Covers: net IFC FCS commitment change, private capital mobilisation ratio, and non-financial additionality realised vs anticipated.

IDA21 contains no specific Policy Commitment for Quality at Entry, disbursement rates, or project restructuring practice in FCS countries — the three operational dimensions where IEG evidence most clearly identifies failure. Add PCs on these three dimensions without waiting for the MTR. The evidence base already warrants them. The MTR is not scheduled until mid-FY28; two years of FCS project approvals will occur in the interim without the operational commitments the evidence requires.

What it requires: Board submission in FY26 adding three FCS operational PCs: (a) minimum Quality at Entry S+ rate for new FCS approvals; (b) disbursement rate floor for FCS operations by year 3; (c) mandatory restructuring review for FCS projects rated MU at mid-term.

Define a formal governance process triggered when FCS Scorecard outcomes fall below agreed thresholds across two consecutive Annual Meeting cycles. Management brings a corrective action plan to the Board within 90 days. This converts the Scorecard from a visibility instrument to an accountability instrument. The current system — receiving IEG findings through the Results and Performance report without formal management accountability — must end.

What it requires: Board resolution establishing the protocol at IDA21 MTR. Define threshold triggers for each of the 22 FCS-disaggregated indicators. Management corrective action plan subject to Board review, not information only.

Convert IDA21’s discretionary permission for third-party implementation in CPIA ≤2.5 RECA countries into a standard modality with provider accountability standards and transition pathways. Somalia’s model — delivering 67.8% S+ in an active conflict environment through third-party implementation — is the template. The Digital Transformation Compact proposed in the strategy provides a vehicle for operationalising this if implemented correctly.

What it requires: Operational Policy statement establishing third-party implementation as the default in RECA countries with CPIA ≤2.5. Provider accreditation framework and accountability standards. Explicit transition pathway to government systems as capacity develops.

Individual project approval by the resident Board co-opts governance into the approval culture. Having approved a project, the Board cannot scrutinise its failure without implicating its own prior endorsement. Move the Board toward portfolio-level oversight: sector performance reviews, GP outcome targets, management accountability for aggregate outcome rates. Delegate project approval for standard operations below SDR 200 million to the President. AIIB, NDB, and EIB all operate with non-resident Boards and delegated project approval without compromising governance. The reform is structural but achievable. The 2009 Zedillo Commission recommended it. The data since then has made the case stronger, not weaker.

What it requires: Board resolution delegating standard project approval to the President. Establishment of annual Presidential Portfolio Performance Review covering IEG-validated outcome rates by instrument, region, and GP. Management corrective action plan when rates fall below agreed thresholds.