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Tuesday, April 7, 2026
Analysis

The Full Picture


MDB Results 2026: An Independent Assessment — Day 7 of 7

The Full Picture

Gado cartoon: Then and Now — IMF and World Bank, The EastAfrican
Cartoon by Gado (Godfrey Mwampembwa), originally published in The EastAfrican. © Gado. Reproduced for commentary and analysis purposes. All rights reserved by the artist.

The last morning in Washington.

Kofi sat by the window of the hotel while his father packed. Outside, the same grey sky. The same streets. Somewhere on Pennsylvania Avenue, the cruise ship. Around the corner, the two battleships facing each other. Across town, the casino and the carnival ship. And in other cities, in other time zones, the dhow, and the Atakebune.

Six days. Six ships. No genie today. They had all said what they had to say.

Kofi had a notebook. He opened it now and read what he had written.


The Six Ships — In the Order He Had Visited Them

World Bank
The cruise ship. $577 billion lent. Share of projects rated S+ reduced from 81.8% in 1970–74 to 26.4% in 2005–09. It has recovered a bit — but something seriously went wrong. The model set up in 1944 needs recalibration.
IMF
Two battleships. Huge resources. Not a single project rated since the Fund was set up in 1944. There is no benchmark for comparison. A hugely ineffective rating agency that does thematic reviews but leaves out inconvenient stories — such as the $3.4bn single-shot disbursement in COVID to Nigeria without proper controls or monitoring. Both neighbours across 19th Street continuing the cold war that never ended. Very large donor-funded technical assistance programme producing confidential reports and questionable results.
IFC
The palace casino. Still trying to cope with market changes. Has not figured out its act in FCV countries. Who would fund an agency that only has an 11% satisfactory rate for its projects in fragile states? Croupiers in Washington, tables in Kinshasa. The PSW — $2.5 billion to go where the private sector would not — used to replace the chips the IFC would have played with anyway. Business model is a work in progress.
AfDB
The dhow. 94% satisfactory — every year, every cycle. The task manager who wrote the rating was wrong, and kept it. The smile that does not change. The adjusted plausible range: 61–75%. The hope of a continent on the agency. If everything is so great, how come children don’t have a light to study under?
ADB
The Atakebune. Serves its constituents well. IED validates everything. The management-IED gap: 12 points. Not closing. The Shogunate needs to decide the route for the future. How is it adapting to the changing world?
IDB
The carnival ship. The borrowers built it and run it. Management: 81% satisfactory. OVE: 53%. A 28-point gap. A decade. They evaluated the evaluation and found the culture was never changed. Poco a poco. Todavía no.

Kofi read through his notes a second time. Then he closed the notebook and looked out the window.

His father came and sat beside him.

“What do you think?”

Kofi thought for a long time before answering.

“They are trying,” he said.

His father waited.

“The people in the buildings are trying. The genies knew their numbers. They were not comfortable with the bad ones. The ADB genie was precise and honest. The IDB genie was sad about the twenty-seven percent even while the music was playing. The IFC genie knew exactly what eleven percent meant.”

“And the numbers have not changed in a decade. So trying is not enough. Something else has to change.”


“What would you change?” his father asked.

Kofi looked at his notebook.

“Six ships. Six things. I wrote them down.”

First — You cannot be approving projects and also supervising your own approvals. The Board of both the Bank and the Fund need to get out of the business of micromanaging the institutions and start doing the tasks for which they were set up — holding management to account for results. Once they do that, they will be far more effective and the cost on the institutions will reduce. These Boards cost these agencies around fifteen times more than comparable institutions such as the AIIB.
Second — There has to be accountability for failed projects. The incentive structure within the Bank has to change from rewarding project approval to project results. This is a no-brainer — but it has not happened for the last fifty years. Since there is no penalty on staff for failed projects, that explains the trend since the 1970s.
Third — The Fund needs to start rating its projects. It is a complete outlier in the MDB system that has no idea how it has performed for the last 82 years. Decisive action also needs to be taken on the central issue of overlap in tasks with the Bank. The two agencies have shown clearly over the last 35 years that they are not up to the task of resolving their issues by themselves. External decision-making is required.
Fourth — The Bank is presently revamping its FCV strategy. The focus will again be on jobs and the private sector. The same song that has been sung for more than a decade. The experience so far suggests that the binding constraint to private sector development in FCV settings is not the availability of concessional finance, but the institutional capacity to deploy it effectively. IFC’s performance in FCV markets—characterised by low outcome rates, weak additionality, and limited scale—raises a fundamental question about the current model under which IDA Private Sector Window resources are exclusively channelled through IFC and MIGA. If delivery capability, not capital scarcity, is the constraint, then the allocation mechanism itself must be reconsidered. A competitive model—under which concessional resources are allocated to the actors best able to deliver measurable outcomes—would align incentives, improve efficiency, and introduce accountability currently absent in the system. The job agenda dictates that alternatives be considered and implemented.
Fifth — Borrowing countries are not only beneficiaries. They are also victims of poor decisions made in Washington DC. There needs to be accountability for MDBs. The veil of sovereign guarantee has to be lifted. Countries should not be made to pay for irresponsible decisions made in DC. MDBs need to be penalised for such projects and be required to pay penalty from net income and their own budgets. Not IDA budgets. This is the mechanism that has been used for transferring institutional failure to the borrowing countries till now. It needs to stop.
Sixth — When the evaluator says something is wrong, act on it. The IDB accepted 96% of OVE’s recommendations. It implemented 75%. One in four — agreed and not acted on. That is not accountability. It is a similar story in other MDBs. These reports are not meant for the genie in the basement — but to improve the lives of poor people on the planet.

His father was quiet for a moment.

“That is a good list.”

“It is not a long list,” Kofi said. “None of it is impossible. And the fifth one — the veil of sovereign guarantee — that is the one nobody in those buildings wants to talk about.”


“Which evaluation office is best?” Kofi asked.

His father looked at him carefully.

“The ADB,” Kofi said, not waiting. “The IED validates everything. It signs its name to the disagreement. It publishes the gap. You cannot pretend it is not broken when someone has written it down and put their name on it.”

“And the worst?”

“The IMF. Not because it is bad. Because it does not rate. You cannot fix what you do not measure.”

RankInstitution / EvaluatorWhy
1 — BestADB — IEDValidates all PCRs; independent ratings override management; publishes management-IED gap in signed annual report; best operational integration
2IDB — OVEValidates all PCRs; reports to Board; ReTS tracking innovative — but too detached from operations; independence reduces uptake
3World Bank / IFC — IEGValidates all ICRs; reports to Board via CODE — but Board co-authors all loans it approves, compromising independent oversight
4AfDB — IDEVSample only; validates plausibility, not independent ratings; no published management-IDEV divergence data; weakest of the five
5 — WorstIMF — IEODoes not rate lending. Thematic evaluations only. Zero project ratings in 149 countries. You cannot fix what you do not measure.

“Are they going to get better?” Kofi asked.

His father looked out the window at the grey Washington morning.

“Some of them. Yes. The question is whether they get better fast enough. The Spring Meetings are in two weeks. The same shareholders will sit in the same rooms and hear the same management reports. Aid budgets are under stress. The demand for support is greater than ever. Things have to change. Otherwise — USAID will not have been an outlier.”

“But some of them will,” Kofi said.

“Some of them will. That is how things change. Slowly, then faster.”


What Would Better Look Like

An evaluation office that validates every project at every institution — not just three of the six.

A Board that reads the independent evaluation before it approves the next capital increase. Not the management summary of the independent evaluation.

Staff in the field. Not 96% of fragile state investments placed from Washington. People in the room.

A presidency that is open. Selected on merit. The WTO did it in 2021. The precedent exists.

Measuring outcomes, not outputs. Not loans approved — whether the reform happened. Not disbursements — whether the water stayed clean.

These are not radical proposals. They are the same proposals the evaluation offices have been making for a decade. The institutions have the architecture. What they need is the will.


Kofi closed his notebook. His father had finished packing.

His mother came in from the other room. Chinwe. She had been patient all week — patient while her husband took Kofi to the marble buildings, patient while Kofi came home each evening with his notebook full of numbers and ships and gaps. She had said little. She had listened. On the last morning she said:

“I am going home. And I want to take you with me.”

Kofi looked at his father.

“Your mother knows things the genies do not,” his father said.

Chinwe was from Benin City. Edo State. The Niger Delta. One of the most lush and richest regions on the planet. Home to Nigeria’s oil resources. Also the most volatile and dangerous. She had worked in the buildings on Pennsylvania Avenue for years. She knew what was inside them. She also knew what was outside them — in a way the buildings did not.

She wanted to show him a project in her own city that had delivered to her community. People had benefitted. They remembered the project and the team. They also remembered the team member who had been kidnapped. The good and the bad. The rich and the poor. The optimism and the pessimism. She was going to take her son to see the real world away from these paper genies sleeping in their buildings in their basements.

They took a taxi to the airport. It drove down 19th Street. The World Bank on the right. The IMF on the left. Kofi looked at both of them through the window as they passed.

He did not smile. He did not frown.

He was thinking about what his father had said. Slowly, then faster.

He was thinking about the woman in the Haitian painting. The small bridge in a creek. The road that someone GPS-mapped in a flood. The fisheries project that a beneficiary stood in front of a camera and talked about.

The money exists. The institutions exist. The evaluators exist. The evidence exists. The gap between the evidence and the behaviour — that is the problem. And problems that can be named can be solved.

Next stop: Benin City.

His mother’s city. Her people. Her creeks. The place the buildings on Pennsylvania Avenue were built to serve.

He found his own way to the gate.



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