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Tuesday, May 12, 2026

Nigeria Water


Nigeria Water Sector  ·  World Bank  ·  MDB Reform Platform

Does the World Bank Learn from Project Failures? Eight Water Projects in Nigeria. 34 Years. $1.8 Billion.

The Same Diagnosis. The Same Failure. The Same Loan. From Lagos Water Supply (1993) to SURWASH (2021).

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Full Paper — 24 Pages (PDF) DOES THE WORLD BANK LEARN FROM PROJECT FAILURES? Draws on two IEG PPARs, five ICR Reviews, the SURWASH ISR (June 2025), two IEG global water evaluations, and the IEG Master Database of 10,542 rated projects.
↓  Download Full Paper (PDF)
$1.1bnCommitted across seven IEG-rated water supply projects. Six failures ($1.108bn). One Satisfactory ($5M). Success rate: 0.4%.
34 yrsFrom Lagos Water Supply (1991) to SURWASH (2025). The same diagnosis in every evaluation. The design model did not change.
1Household with improved sanitation under SURWASH ($700M). Target: 280,000. Katsina reported 86. One met standards.
MU ×7Six MU by IEG. One Highly Unsatisfactory. One Satisfactory ($5M). The Seventh (SURWASH) rated MU at mid-term.

Between 1991 and 2025, the World Bank approved eight major water sector operations in Nigeria totalling $1.813 billion. Six failed. One succeeded — a $5 million community-managed pilot that put Water Consumer Associations in charge of technology selection, tariff collection, and operations. IEG’s 2006 evaluation of the early projects found the answer: “The improving trend in project outcomes can in large part be explained by a shift in responsibility for project implementation away from the Federal Ministry of Water Resources.” The Bank then approved four more federal-level projects — each larger than the last.

Central FindingThe Bank’s own evaluators diagnosed the structural problem in 2006. The diagnosis has not changed in 28 years. The design model has not changed. The commitment amount grew sixfold — from $177 million to $700 million. The rating has not changed. The institution produced lessons. It did not learn from them. The difference is $1.8 billion.

The Full Record

#ProjectCommitmentRatingInstrument
1Lagos Water Supply (P002082)$177MModerately UnsatisfactoryInvestment
2Water Rehabilitation (P002084)$260MHighly UnsatisfactoryInvestment
3First Multi-State (P002109)$101MModerately UnsatisfactoryInvestment
4Small Towns Pilot (P064008)$5MSatisfactoryInvestment
5First NUWSRP (P071075)$200MModerately UnsatisfactoryInvestment
6Second NUWSRP (P071391)$200MModerately UnsatisfactoryInvestment
7Third NUWSRP (P123513)$250MModerately UnsatisfactoryInvestment
8SURWASH (P170734)$700MMU (ISR June 2025)PforR

Generation One: The Federal Model Fails (1991–2001)

The Bank’s first generation of water lending was built around the Federal Ministry of Water Resources. Three large projects, implemented through a federal ministry that lacked operational authority over State Water Boards. The Water Rehabilitation Project ($260 million) was rated Highly Unsatisfactory — the worst rating IEG gives. The Niger State Water Board after $260 million in lending: 39 staff per 1,000 connections (benchmark: 2), zero percent metered (benchmark: 100%), 83 percent non-revenue water (benchmark: 15%). Kaduna State after three Bank projects: zero percent of the population with 24-hour service. Only 28 percent of water samples safe for pathogens.

Finding 1 — The Pump That Never WorkedIEG’s PPAR: “The pump was procured by FMWR and installed. The power supply from NEPA was so deficient that the pump could not be consistently operated. The Project allowed for the purchase of standby generators. But the generators could not be operated because the State Water Board did not have the free cash to buy fuel oil.” This chain — pump procured, power fails, generator purchased, no fuel money, system idle — repeated across all 36 states.

The $5 Million Pilot That Worked

The Small Towns Water Supply pilot ($5 million, Satisfactory) reversed every assumption. Communities chose their technology, contributed 10 percent of costs, and managed operations through Water Consumer Associations. Twelve of sixteen systems became operational. Investment cost: $200 per household. IEG rated sustainability as Likely and institutional development as Substantial — the only project in the portfolio where both were positive.

Finding 2 — IEG’s Verdict (2006)“The improving trend in project outcomes can in large part be explained by a shift in responsibility for project implementation away from the Federal Ministry of Water Resources under the National Project, to only two State Water Boards under the Multi-State project, and finally to a clear focus on a limited number of towns under the Small Towns project.” The answer was in the data in 2006. The Bank did not act on it.

Generation Two: The Bank Scales the Model That Failed (2004–2021)

Three consecutive National Urban Water Sector Reform Projects — $120 million, $200 million, $250 million — all through the Federal Ministry, all rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. The First NUWSRP’s gains were reversed within three years: collection efficiency 78% → 60%, O&M coverage 60% → 20%, beneficiaries 5.4 million → 4.1 million. The management ICR rated it MS; IEG’s PPAR downgraded it to MU. The Third project committed $250 million, disbursed $142 million, cancelled $86 million. Rivers State never started.

Finding 3 — The Same Lessons, Written Four TimesThe Third project’s lessons are the First project’s lessons. The First project’s lessons are the 2006 PPAR’s lessons. The 2006 PPAR’s lessons are the 1998 Lagos Water Supply lessons. The Third project’s evaluation recommended a different lending instrument entirely — after $570 million and seventeen years of the same approach.

The Seventh Project: SURWASH ($700 Million)

$700 million. The largest water operation in Nigeria’s history. The instrument the Third project’s evaluation recommended (Program-for-Results). The same Federal Ministry coordinating. Some of the same states (Kaduna, Ekiti, Katsina). The June 2025 Implementation Status Report:

IndicatorTarget (2027)Actual (May 2025)Achievement
PDO RatingModerately UnsatisfactoryMU
Disbursed$700M$93.6M14%
People with basic water6,100,00058,585< 1%
People with improved sanitation1,400,00050.0004%
Households with improved sanitation280,00011 of 86 met standards
Communities achieving ODF5000Zero
National WASH FundYesNoNot established
Political/Governance RiskSubstantialHighUpgraded
Fiduciary RiskSubstantialHighUpgraded
Finding 4 — The Mid-Term ReviewThe MTR found “delays in budget allocations and program execution due to a lack of understanding of the Program-for-Results instrument among state-level decision-makers.” Two contracts terminated in Delta. PIUs using different accounting software. The project was restructured in February 2025. The instrument changed. The rating did not.

The Timeline: 34 Years

1991
Water Rehabilitation approved ($260M). Nationwide, 36 states, managed by FMWR. Rated Highly Unsatisfactory.
1993
Lagos Water Supply approved ($177M). Average consumption: 12 litres/capita/day. Rated MU.
2000
Small Towns pilot approved ($5M). Community-managed. 12/16 operational. Rated Satisfactory.
2006
IEG PPAR 36443: “Shift away from FMWR explains improving outcomes.” Niger SWB: 39 staff/1000 connections. 0% metered.
2004–14
Three NUWSRPs approved: $120M, $200M, $250M. All MU. Same FMWR. Same structural constraints. $570M total.
2017
IEG PPAR 115782: First NUWSRP gains reversed. O&M coverage 60%→20%. Beneficiaries 5.4M→4.1M.
2021
SURWASH approved ($700M). PforR instrument. Seven states. FMWR coordinating.
2025
SURWASH ISR: Rated MU. 58,585 of 6.1M reached. 1 household of 280,000. Zero ODF communities. Restructured.
Finding 5 — Not an OutlierIEG’s 2010 global evaluation: only 15% of projects achieved cost recovery. IEG’s 2017 evaluation: 42% of “passing” projects at significant risk. Financial covenants “yielded disappointing results.” Nigeria’s failures are the sector norm.


Tracking SURWASH: A Live Project Going Downhill

This platform will track the SURWASH project (P170734) through to its closing date in June 2027. The three source documents are published below. The ISR, the restructuring paper, and the original project appraisal document are the public record of a $700 million operation that is following the same trajectory as the six that preceded it.

The Water Global Practice has committed $700 million of IDA resources — concessional funds meant for the poorest countries — to a project that has reached less than 1 percent of its water target and achieved one household with improved sanitation after four years. The Mid-Term Review found that state-level decision-makers did not understand the lending instrument. The project has already been restructured. Political and fiduciary risks have been upgraded to High.

This is where the Water GP’s attention should be. Not on celebrity partnerships. Not on ever-more-ambitious global targets. Not on glossy launches at Spring Meetings. On the $700 million that is going downhill in the same country, in the same sector, through the same Federal Ministry, with the same structural constraints that IEG diagnosed in 2006. The track record is public. The ISR is public. The question of whether SURWASH will join the six that came before it — or become the first large-scale success in 34 years of Nigeria water lending — will be answered by June 2027. This platform will document the answer.

SURWASH Source Documents (P170734)

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Implementation Status Report (ISR) — June 2025 PDO: Moderately Unsatisfactory. IP: Moderately Unsatisfactory. 14% disbursed. 58,585 of 6.1M reached.
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Restructuring Paper — February 2025 First restructuring. DLIs revised. Scalability introduced. New states onboarding.
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Project Appraisal Document (PAD) — May 2021 $700M PforR. Seven states. 6.1M water target. 1.4M sanitation target. FMWR coordinating.
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Full 24-Page Paper Two IEG PPARs, five ICR Reviews, SURWASH ISR (June 2025), two IEG global water evaluations, IEG Master Database.
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