Executive Summary
The IDA Private Sector Window (PSW), launched under IDA18, represents one of the most ambitious attempts by the World Bank Group to mobilize private investment in the world’s poorest and most fragile countries. By blending concessional IDA resources with the investment capabilities of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the guarantee instruments of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the PSW was designed to function as a catalytic instrument — using small doses of subsidy to unlock large flows of private capital.
This paper provides a project-level empirical assessment of PSW performance across its full portfolio of 206 projects totalling $6.18 billion in commitments, approved between 2017 and 2025. The evidence reveals a systematic and widening gap between stated objectives and actual outcomes.
Core Findings| Metric | Finding |
|---|---|
| Total PSW Commitments | $6.18 billion (206 projects, 2017–2025) |
| IFC Institutional Concentration | 87% of projects IFC-linked (BFF + LCF) |
| Median Leverage | 3.1x (well below benchmarks for blended finance) |
| Median Subsidy Intensity | 32% of total project cost |
| LCF Median Subsidy | 62% — nearly 3× BFF and MGF |
| Fully Subsidized Projects (≥100%) | 28 projects — all through the Local Currency Facility |
| Cost of Mobilization | $0.48 of concessional funds per $1 mobilized (median) |
| Non-Africa Avg Subsidy vs Africa | 47.5% vs 37.2% — counter to frontier targeting logic |
These findings point to a structural problem: the PSW is not functioning as a catalytic instrument. It is operating as a subsidy-intensive, internally allocated financing mechanism without competitive discipline, price discovery, or systematic evidence of additionality.
The PSW is constrained not by ambition, but by design. A closed, non-competitive allocation system in which concessional resources are reserved exclusively for IFC and MIGA — without market testing or external benchmarking — creates weak incentives, obscures subsidy efficiency, and inhibits innovation. Introducing competitive allocation mechanisms would significantly improve developmental outcomes per dollar of concessional subsidy deployed.
Reform Recommendations
- Introduce reverse auctions for a portion of PSW resources, allowing DFIs and accredited private investors to bid on the minimum subsidy required to make investments viable
- Establish an open-architecture platform enabling regional development banks and bilateral DFIs to access PSW facilities on equal terms with IFC
- Shift the LCF to a results-based model, with subsidy payments contingent on successful local currency mobilization outcomes
- Create an independent additionality verification mechanism separate from IFC’s internal AIMM system
- Publish project-level subsidy ratios systematically to enable external scrutiny
1. Introduction
When IDA donors approved the Private Sector Window in 2016, the logic was compelling: the poorest and most fragile countries suffer not from a lack of development ideas but from a failure of private capital markets to price and absorb risk appropriately. By placing a layer of concessional protection — first loss positions, guarantees, local currency swaps — between IDA resources and private investors, the PSW would catalyze flows that would otherwise never materialize.
Nearly a decade and $6.18 billion later, the central question is no longer conceptual. It is empirical: is the PSW allocating scarce concessional resources efficiently, and is it achieving outcomes proportionate to the public subsidy deployed?
This paper addresses that question directly, drawing on project-level data covering the full PSW portfolio and internal evaluation evidence from the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). The findings are troubling. Subsidy levels are high, leverage is modest, institutional concentration is extreme, and there is no mechanism in the current design capable of ensuring that concessional resources are deployed at minimum necessary cost.
2. The PSW Architecture: Design and Stated Objectives
2.1 Structure and Facilities
The PSW operates through four facilities, each addressing a different dimension of private sector risk:
| Facility | Managed By | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Blended Finance Facility (BFF) | IFC | First-loss protection and subsidized loans to de-risk IFC investments |
| Local Currency Facility (LCF) | IFC / TCX | Currency risk mitigation via cross-currency swaps to enable local currency lending |
| MIGA Guarantee Facility (MGF) | MIGA | Political risk guarantees to support foreign direct investment in IDA countries |
| Risk Mitigation Facility (RMF) | MIGA / WB | Partial risk guarantees for PPP-style projects including sovereign obligations |
2.2 Stated Objectives and Additionality Logic
Across IDA18, IDA19, and IDA20 replenishment papers, the PSW was consistently justified around three claims: enabling investments that would not otherwise occur (additionality); mobilizing private capital by de-risking projects at minimal subsidy cost; and targeting the hardest markets — fragile, conflict-affected states and underserved sectors.
The additionality claim is central. Without it, PSW support amounts to a transfer of public resources to transactions that private markets would fund anyway, at unnecessary cost to IDA’s broader development mandate.
2.3 The Governance Question
A critical design choice — largely unremarked in public discussion — is that PSW resources are allocated exclusively to IFC and MIGA. No competitive process determines which institution accesses funds. No external benchmark tests whether subsidy levels are necessary. IFC both originates and assesses the additionality of its own transactions. This structural feature shapes everything that follows.
3. Portfolio Analysis: 206 Projects, 2017–2025
3.1 Scale and Growth Trajectory
The PSW portfolio has grown substantially since its launch, reflecting both replenishment increases and expanding IFC pipeline capacity. Peak deployment occurred in 2023, with $1.64 billion committed across 40 projects — a single-year figure exceeding the entire portfolio of IDA18’s first three years combined.
Table 1: PSW Commitments by Year, 2017–2025| Year | Projects | PSW Commitments (US$M) | Cumulative Total (US$M) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | 2 | $18 | $18 |
| 2018 | 9 | $148 | $166 |
| 2019 | 19 | $483 | $649 |
| 2020 | 26 | $803 | $1,452 |
| 2021 | 24 | $601 | $2,053 |
| 2022 | 38 | $1,053 | $3,106 |
| 2023 | 40 | $1,644 | $4,750 |
| 2024 | 28 | $591 | $5,341 |
| 2025* | 20 | $837 | $6,178 |
| Total | 206 | $6,178 | — |
* 2025 data reflects approvals through mid-year.
3.2 Facility Distribution
The facility breakdown reveals the dominant role of IFC-managed instruments.
Table 2: PSW Portfolio by Facility| Facility | Projects | Share (%) | Managed By |
|---|---|---|---|
| Blended Finance Facility (BFF) | 88 | 42.7% | IFC |
| Local Currency Facility (LCF) | 72 | 35.0% | IFC / TCX |
| Mixed (BFF+LCF, BFF+MGF, etc.) | 12 | 5.8% | IFC / MIGA |
| MIGA Guarantee Facility (MGF) | 34 | 16.5% | MIGA |
| IFC-linked subtotal (BFF + LCF + mixed) | 172 | 83.5% | IFC-dominated |
Over 83% of PSW projects are linked to IFC-managed facilities. The PSW is not an open platform — it is a closed allocation system in which IFC functions simultaneously as deal originator, subsidy applicant, and additionality assessor.
3.3 Regional Distribution
Africa accounts for 128 of 206 projects (62.1%) and 47.3% of total PSW commitments. A striking finding emerges when subsidy intensity is overlaid: non-Africa regions carry higher average subsidy ratios (47.5%) than Africa (37.2%). Europe and Central Asia records 67.1% — well above any Africa sub-region. This runs directly counter to frontier market targeting logic.
Table 3: Regional Distribution| Region | Projects | Share | Avg Subsidy | PSW Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Africa West (AFW) | 68 | 33.0% | 37.5% | ~28% |
| Africa East (AFE) | 46 | 22.3% | 36.4% | ~19% |
| Africa Region (AFR) | 14 | 6.8% | 40.0% | ~6% |
| Africa subtotal | 128 | 62.1% | 37.2% | 47.3% |
| South Asia (SAR) | 17 | 8.3% | 43.8% | ~15% |
| East Asia Pacific (EAP) | 12 | 5.8% | 51.3% | ~9% |
| Europe & Central Asia (ECA) | 11 | 5.3% | 67.1% | ~8% |
| Other / Multi-region | 34 | 16.5% | 47.5% | ~21% |
4. Subsidy Intensity: The Empirical Core
4.1 Distribution of Subsidy Ratios
The subsidy ratio — PSW support as a percentage of total project cost — is the most important metric for assessing whether concessional resources are deployed efficiently. A catalytic instrument should exhibit low subsidy ratios or clearly demonstrated necessity in markets where no private capital would otherwise flow.
Table 4: Distribution of Subsidy Ratios — Full Portfolio| Statistic | Value | Projects | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mean subsidy ratio | 41.1% | — | Portfolio average masks wide dispersion |
| Median subsidy ratio | 32.2% | — | Typical project: ~1/3 concessional |
| 25th percentile | 16.5% | — | Best-performing quartile |
| 75th percentile | 52.8% | — | Upper quartile: majority concessional |
| 90th percentile | 100.0% | — | Top decile: fully subsidized |
| Maximum | 140.0% | 1 | PSW exceeds total project cost |
| Projects with subsidy >40% | >40% | 86 | 42% of portfolio |
| Fully subsidized (≥100%) | 100%+ | 28 | All through LCF |
4.2 Subsidy Intensity by Facility — A Critical Divergence
Table 5: Subsidy Ratios by Facility| Facility | Median Subsidy | Mean Subsidy | Key Implication |
|---|---|---|---|
| MIGA Guarantee Facility (MGF) | 23.4% | 24.2% | Lowest subsidy; guarantee structure limits exposure |
| Blended Finance Facility (BFF) | 25.0% | 30.0% | Moderate subsidy; first-loss structure |
| Local Currency Facility (LCF) | 61.6% | 64.7% | Structurally high — swap amount equals project cost in many cases |
The LCF exhibits subsidy ratios nearly 2.5 times higher than BFF and nearly 3 times higher than MGF. In 28 LCF projects — 14% of the entire portfolio — PSW support equals or exceeds the full project cost. The ‘mobilization’ rationale collapses entirely in these cases.
4.3 The Top 50: Most Subsidized Projects
Table 6: Top 50 Projects by Subsidy Ratio — Summary Statistics| Metric | Value | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| Average subsidy ratio (Top 50) | 86.8% | These are not blended finance — they are concessional finance |
| Median subsidy ratio (Top 50) | 100.0% | The median project in this group is fully subsidized |
| Projects at ≥100% | 28 of 50 | 56% of the top cohort fully concessional |
| Projects at ≥80% | 32 of 50 | 64% majority-concessional |
| Projects at ≥60% | 47 of 50 | 94% have high subsidy intensity |
| Dominant facility | LCF (100%) | Every fully subsidized project uses LCF |
5. Leverage Performance and Cost of Mobilization
Table 7: PSW Leverage Statistics| Metric | Value | Benchmark Context |
|---|---|---|
| Mean leverage | 5.09x | Driven upward by a small number of high-leverage outliers |
| Median leverage | 3.10x | More representative of typical transaction outcome |
| Implied: $1 PSW unlocks (median) | $2.10 additional | Moderate by blended finance standards |
| OECD blended finance benchmark | ~7x | PSW underperforms DFI sector median |
Using median values: PSW subsidy = 32.2% of project cost; leverage = 3.10x. This implies that for every dollar of additional (non-PSW) investment unlocked, approximately $0.48 of concessional PSW funding is deployed. In the absence of any mechanism to determine whether the $0.48 represents a minimum, there is no basis for claiming this is efficient allocation.
6. Structural Diagnosis: Why the Current Model Falls Short
6.1 Internal Allocation Without Competition
The PSW’s institutional architecture creates a fundamental problem of incentive alignment. IFC occupies all major roles simultaneously: deal originator, subsidy applicant, additionality assessor, and implementation partner. This concentration of functions, with no external counterweight or competitive test, creates predictable incentive distortions. IFC has structural incentives to maximize deal flow, minimize transaction risk, and justify subsidy use ex post — none of which are synonymous with maximizing development impact per dollar of concessional resource.
6.2 Asymmetric Risk-Reward Structure
The PSW creates an asymmetric distribution of risk and return. IDA absorbs downside risk through first-loss positions and currency exposure. IFC retains fee income, management economics, and reputational upside from deals. Without competitive discipline, this creates conditions for systematic over-subsidization: IFC has limited incentive to negotiate subsidy levels downward, and IDA has no mechanism to test whether lower subsidy would suffice.
6.3 The LCF Design Problem
The Local Currency Facility’s mechanics create a particularly acute version of this problem. Because the LCF absorbs the full currency mismatch in a cross-currency swap, the PSW commitment can equal the full loan amount — producing subsidy ratios of 100% by structural design rather than project necessity. The 28 projects showing 100% subsidy ratios are not exceptional failures; they reflect the LCF’s standard mechanics applied to situations where local currency borrowing capacity is entirely contingent on PSW support.
6.4 The Fundamental Contradiction
The PSW is premised on the claim that markets fail in IDA countries. Yet the portfolio evidence shows high subsidy intensity in relatively accessible markets (including ECA), concentration in financial intermediaries that operate commercial models, and modest leverage below sector benchmarks. If markets genuinely fail, higher leverage would be expected once PSW support reduces risk. If leverage remains modest, either the subsidy is not enabling transformational investment — or its level exceeds what is necessary. The data suggests the latter.
7. Is the PSW Delivering on the Jobs Agenda?
The World Bank Group’s April 2025 Development Committee paper, Jobs: The Path to Prosperity, identifies five high-potential sectors as the primary engines of job creation: energy and infrastructure, agribusiness, health, tourism, and value-added manufacturing. It explicitly states that MSMEs and direct productive investment, not financial intermediation alone, will be the game changer for job creation. The PSW’s portfolio composition raises a fundamental question: is the instrument actually funding the sectors most capable of creating jobs?
Table 8: PSW Allocation vs Jobs Agenda Priorities| Sector | Projects | PSW (US$M) | Share | Jobs Agenda? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial Intermediaries (banks, MFIs) | 52 | $2,176 | 35.2% | Indirect link only |
| Energy & Infrastructure | 21 | $585 | 9.5% | ✓ Priority sector |
| Telecom / Digital | 7 | $483 | 7.8% | Enabling sector |
| Agribusiness | 7 | $217 | 3.5% | ✓ Priority sector |
| Health | 7 | $73 | 1.2% | ✓ Priority sector |
| Manufacturing | 4 | $50 | 0.8% | ✓ Priority sector |
| Tourism | 3 | $24 | 0.4% | ✓ Priority sector |
| Other / Unclassified | 105 | $2,569 | 41.6% | Mixed |
| 5 Jobs-Agenda Sectors TOTAL | 42 | $949 | 15.4% | Core mandate |
The five sectors identified by the Bank’s own Jobs Council as highest-potential for employment creation receive only 15.4% of PSW resources — less than half the share absorbed by financial intermediaries (35.2%) alone. Financial intermediaries receive nearly $2.2 billion in PSW support at an average 69.3% subsidy, while the 5 jobs-priority sectors share $949 million. This is a fundamental misalignment.
7.2 The Subsidy-Jobs Inversion
When subsidy intensity is cross-referenced with directness of job creation, a striking inversion emerges: sectors with the strongest direct links to employment receive the lowest subsidies, while financial intermediaries — with only indirect and uncertain employment effects — receive the highest.
Table 9: Subsidy Intensity vs Jobs Creation Directness| Sector | Median Subsidy | Jobs Link | Implication |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tourism | 21.7% | Direct | Lowest subsidy, highest direct employment density |
| Energy & Infrastructure | 21.4% | Direct + enabling | Efficient deployment — 21 projects, 76% in Africa |
| Manufacturing | 23.0% | Direct | Strong employment per unit investment — underweighted |
| Agribusiness | 50.0% | Direct | High subsidy but strong job multiplier — appropriate |
| Health | 57.6% | Direct | Justified by 3.4x job multiplier in LICs |
| Financial Intermediaries + Housing | 69.3% | Indirect only | Highest subsidy — weakest direct jobs link |
The PSW as currently structured is not delivering on the jobs agenda. It is a financial-sector-heavy, intermediary-dominated instrument with high subsidy costs, no jobs measurement, and a sector allocation that inverts the priorities set by the Bank’s own Jobs Council. The Bank cannot credibly claim to prioritize jobs while deploying its flagship private sector instrument predominantly through financial intermediaries at 69% average subsidy, without measuring a single job.
8. The Case for Competitive Allocation
8.1 The Efficiency Argument
The core argument for competitive allocation is simple: in the absence of a market test, there is no basis for concluding that observed subsidy levels are either necessary or efficient. A well-designed auction or competitive bidding mechanism would require prospective implementers to reveal the minimum subsidy at which they could make a project viable. The analogy with renewable energy feed-in tariff auctions is instructive: competitive pressure on subsidy levels consistently delivers more development per dollar than administratively set rates.
8.2 Responding to Standard Objections
| Objection | Response |
|---|---|
| Only IFC has the risk management capacity to operate in IDA countries | The data shows 100% subsidy ratios in ECA and EAP markets where other DFIs operate routinely. Risk management capacity is not unique to IFC in these contexts. |
| Competition would fragment the pipeline | This risk is manageable through IDA oversight and country-level coordination requirements. The current ‘coordination’ benefit comes at high cost in efficiency and accountability. |
| Competitive processes take too long for fragile state contexts | Rapid competitive mechanisms — pre-qualified bidder pools, streamlined review — are feasible. Slow deployment is already a documented PSW problem under the current model. |
| IFC’s One Bank role ensures policy coherence | Policy coherence is an organizational management objective, not a justification for monopolistic access to public subsidy. Alignment can be required of any PSW implementer. |
9. Reform Roadmap: A Phased Approach
9.1 Immediate Reforms (IDA21 Window)
- Mandatory publication of project-level subsidy ratios for all PSW operations, enabling external scrutiny and benchmarking
- Independent additionality verification: Commission IEG or an independent third party to review a random sample of PSW projects annually, with findings linked to allocation decisions
- LCF mechanics review: Examine whether the structural 100% subsidy feature of LCF transactions represents genuine necessity or design artifact, and introduce tiered pricing where market conditions permit
9.2 Medium-Term Structural Reform
- Pilot competitive window: Allocate 15–20% of IDA21 PSW resources through a competitive process open to accredited DFIs and impact investors
- Reverse auction mechanism: For defined thematic windows, invite bids specifying minimum subsidy required and projected development outcomes. Award to proposals meeting impact thresholds at lowest subsidy cost
- Results-based LCF: Shift a portion of LCF allocations to outcome-based structures where subsidy is disbursed contingent on verified local currency mobilization
9.3 Long-Term Architecture
- Open-access PSW platform: Enable any accredited institution to apply for PSW support, with IDA retaining approval authority and outcome monitoring
- Performance-based replenishment share: Link IFC’s share of IDA22-onwards PSW resources to demonstrated performance, including leverage ratios, subsidy efficiency, and IEG impact assessments
- Sector floor: Allocate a minimum 40% of PSW resources to the five Jobs Council priority sectors by IDA22
| Phase | Reform | Mechanism | Timeframe |
|---|---|---|---|
| Immediate | Publish subsidy ratios | Disclosure policy | IDA21 replenishment |
| Immediate | Independent additionality review | IEG mandate | IDA21 replenishment |
| Immediate | LCF mechanics review | Internal review + reform | 2025–2026 |
| Medium-term | Competitive pilot (15–20% PSW) | Open bidding process | 2026–2028 |
| Medium-term | Reverse auction windows | Thematic windows | 2026–2028 |
| Medium-term | Results-based LCF | Outcome verification | 2027–2029 |
| Long-term | Open-access PSW platform | Governance reform | IDA22 onwards |
| Long-term | Performance-based replenishment | Allocation formula | IDA22 onwards |
10. Conclusion
The IDA Private Sector Window was conceived as one of the most innovative instruments in multilateral development finance — a bridge between the world’s deepest concessional resources and the risk appetite of private capital. The ambition remains valid. The execution requires fundamental reconsideration.
Project-level evidence from 206 transactions totalling $6.18 billion reveals a consistent pattern: high subsidy intensity (median 32%, rising to 62% for LCF operations), modest leverage (median 3.1x), institutional concentration in a single entity, and 28 projects financed entirely with concessional resources. Europe and Central Asia carries higher average subsidy than Africa. The financial sector absorbs the most heavily subsidized support. Additionality is asserted rather than demonstrated.
These are not random implementation failures. They are the predictable outcomes of a structural design that eliminates competitive discipline, concentrates institutional interests, and removes market-testing from allocation decisions. The PSW cannot self-correct within its current architecture.
The barrier to PSW reform is not technical — the models for competitive allocation in blended finance are well established. The barrier is institutional and political. Donor pressure at IDA replenishment negotiations, combined with the kind of evidence-based challenge this paper represents, offers the most credible path to change. The Spring Meetings provide an opportunity to begin that conversation in earnest.
Annex A: Complete Portfolio — Top 50 Projects by Subsidy Ratio
| # | Project Name | Region | Facility | Sector | Subsidy % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Banque de l’Habitat du Senegal (BHS Loan) | AFW | LCF+BFF | Housing Finance | 140% |
| 2 | BOA Congo SL | AFW | LCF | Commercial Bank | 100% |
| 3 | BOP Arvand FY25 | ECA | LCF | Microfinance | 100% |
| 4 | CBC Haiti Climate | LCR | LCF | Climate Finance | 100% |
| 5 | Tappoo THL Green Fiji | EAP | LCF | Green Finance | 100% |
| 6 | Bank of Bhutan | SAR | LCF | Commercial Bank | 100% |
| 7 | ALCB Fund | AFW | LCF | Fund / FI | 100% |
| 8 | First Housing Finance (FHF) Tanzania | AFE | LCF | Housing Finance | 100% |
| 9 | BNI Madagascar | AFE | LCF | Commercial Bank | 100% |
| 10 | Bismark Maritime, Project OTTO | EAP | LCF | Maritime / Logistics | 100% |
| 11 | Illovo Malawi | AFE | LCF | Agribusiness | 100% |
| 12 | Bank Kompanion | ECA | LCF | Microfinance | 100% |
| 13 | DKIB-FY25 | ECA | LCF | Commercial Bank | 100% |
| 14 | DCM DBH Housing | SAR | LCF | Housing Finance | 100% |
| 15 | BOP Bank Eskhata | ECA | LCF | Commercial Bank | 100% |
| 16 | KICB Micro | ECA | LCF | Microfinance | 100% |
| 17 | ACEP Burkina Faso | AFW | LCF | Microfinance | 100% |
| 18 | Humo SL LCY | ECA | LCF | Microfinance | 100% |
| 19 | Arvand SL LCY | ECA | LCF | Microfinance | 100% |
| 20 | RMDC | SAR | LCF | Microfinance | 100% |
| 21 | ACEP Senegal | AFW | LCF | Microfinance | 100% |
| 22 | LAPO Microfinance Bank | AFW | LCF | Microfinance | 100% |
| 23 | ABL LCY Loan (Acleda Lao) | EAP | LCF | Commercial Bank | 100% |
| 24 | FIG COVID Emergency BoP Program | Multi | LCF | COVID Response | 100% |
| 25 | Infinity Medical | AFE | LCF | Health / Medical | 100% |
| 26 | BD LCY-BRAC Bank Affordable Housing | SAR | LCF | Housing Finance | 100% |
| 27 | Credit Communautaire d’Afrique (CCA) | AFW | LCF | Microfinance | 100% |
| 28 | Demir MSME | ECA | LCF | Commercial Bank | 100% |
| 29 | Baobab MicroCred | AFR | BFF+LCF | Microfinance | 97% |
| 30 | BPC Transmission | — | LCF | Energy / Telecom | 96% |
| 31 | Accra Medical | AFW | LCF | Healthcare | 85% |
| 32 | TCX Fund | Multi | BFF | Currency Fund | 80% |
| 33 | Csquared RI3 | AFW | BFF | Digital Infra | 78% |
| 34 | World Link Nepal | — | BFF+LCF | Telecom | 69% |
| 35 | HKL Cambodia | EAP | LCF | Microfinance | 67% |
| 36 | Vision Fund | — | LCF | Microfinance | 67% |
| 37 | Airtel Africa II | AFE | LCF | Telecom | 67% |
| 38 | Rwanda BPR T2 | AFE | LCF | Commercial Bank | 67% |
| 39 | CCM Mali | AFW | BFF+LCF | Microfinance | 65% |
| 40 | Mazar IPP | SAR | MGF+RMF | Power / Energy | 64% |
| 41 | NMB Tanzania | AFE | LCF | Commercial Bank | 63% |
| 42 | DCM PEPT ABS | AFW | BFF+LCF | Structured Finance | 62% |
| 43 | EthioChicken ETB | AFE | LCF | Agribusiness | 62% |
| 44 | RSE COVID CIEL | AFE | LCF | COVID Response | 62% |
| 45 | LabAid | SAR | LCF | Healthcare | 60% |
| 46 | Adal Azyk | — | LCF | Agri / Food | 60% |
| 47 | NMB SB DCM | AFE | LCF | Commercial Bank | 60% |
| 48 | Carrefour Medical | — | BFF+LCF | Healthcare | 58% |
| 49 | GB NMB Tanzania | AFE | LCF | Commercial Bank | 57% |
| 50 | Jubaili Agro Tech (JAT) | AFW | LCF | Agribusiness | 57% |
Rows 1–28 (subsidy ≥100%): all are Local Currency Facility transactions — meaning PSW support equals or exceeds total project cost.
Annex B: Key Metrics Reference
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Total PSW commitments | $6.18 billion | IDAPSWProjects.xlsx — full portfolio |
| Total projects | 206 | IDAPSWProjects.xlsx — all facilities |
| Approval period | 2017–2025 | Board approval dates |
| IFC-linked projects | 172 (83.5%) | Facility classification: BFF, LCF, mixed |
| Mean PSW per project | ~$30M | Total / count |
| Median PSW per project | ~$15M | 50th percentile |
| Mean leverage | 5.09x | Total cost / PSW, arithmetic mean |
| Median leverage | 3.10x | 50th percentile |
| Mean subsidy ratio | 41.1% | PSW / project cost, arithmetic mean |
| Median subsidy ratio | 32.2% | 50th percentile |
| P75 subsidy ratio | 52.8% | 75th percentile |
| P90 subsidy ratio | 100.0% | 90th percentile |
| Maximum subsidy ratio | 140.0% | BHS Senegal (LCF+BFF) |
| Fully subsidized projects (≥100%) | 28 | All LCF transactions |
| Projects with subsidy >40% | 86 (42%) | Derived from distribution |
| LCF median subsidy | 61.6% | Facility-level calculation |
| BFF median subsidy | 25.0% | Facility-level calculation |
| MGF median subsidy | 23.4% | Facility-level calculation |
| Cost of mobilization | $0.48 per $1 | Derived from median subsidy/leverage |
| Africa PSW share | 47.3% | AFW + AFE + AFR regions |
| Africa avg subsidy | 37.2% | vs 47.5% non-Africa |
| Peak deployment year | 2023 — $1.64B | 40 projects approved |
Annex C: Glossary of Terms
Additionality: The principle that PSW support enables investment that would not otherwise occur. A project lacks additionality if it could be financed on commercial terms without concessional support.
Blended Finance: The use of concessional public funds to mobilize commercial private capital for development purposes, typically by reducing risk for private investors.
BFF (Blended Finance Facility): IFC-managed PSW facility providing first-loss positions and subsidized loans to reduce risk in IFC investment projects.
LCF (Local Currency Facility): IFC-managed PSW facility providing cross-currency swaps to enable local currency lending in IDA countries where swap markets are thin or absent.
Leverage Ratio: Total project cost divided by PSW support. A leverage ratio of 3x means $1 of PSW generates $3 in total investment (including the PSW itself).
MGF (MIGA Guarantee Facility): MIGA-managed PSW facility providing political risk guarantees to support foreign direct investment in IDA countries.
PSW (Private Sector Window): The IDA mechanism established under IDA18 to use concessional resources to de-risk private investment in the poorest and most fragile countries.
RMF (Risk Mitigation Facility): MIGA/World Bank PSW facility providing partial risk guarantees for PPP-style transactions, covering sovereign performance risks.
Subsidy Ratio: PSW support as a percentage of total project cost. A ratio of 100% indicates the project is entirely financed by PSW concessional resources.
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