

WORLD BANK REFORM ANALYSIS

# Institutional Power Architecture and Portfolio Distortion at the World Bank

*Economist Dominance in Country Management, DPO Instrument Bias, and Development Outcome Costs*

Sub-Saharan Africa Country Director Cohort Analysis · Nigeria · South Africa · Ethiopia · Kenya · Tanzania · Senegal · Ghana · DRC

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## Executive Summary

This report documents a structural dysfunction at the heart of World Bank country operations: the systematic over-representation of macroeconomists in Country Director positions and the consequent distortion of the lending instrument mix toward Development Policy Operations (DPOs) — budget support instruments whose poor development outcome record in Africa is extensively documented by the Bank's own Independent Evaluation Group.

The central empirical finding: across 60+ Country Director tenures in eight major Sub-Saharan African CMUs from 2000 to 2023, Country Directors with primary training in macroeconomics and careers rooted in the Bank's PREM and MTI networks consistently allocate 1.5 to 2 times more of the IDA lending envelope to DPOs than Country Directors from engineering, public health, agriculture, or operations backgrounds. The differential averages 18–20 percentage points of total committed lending — a gap that, at current portfolio volumes, translates to hundreds of millions of dollars per country tenure redirected away from investment operations.

The portfolio consequences are unambiguous. The Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment (MTI) Global Practice records the worst development outcome rate of any practice at scale: 18.5 percent Satisfactory globally across 481 evaluated projects, and 13.5 percent Satisfactory in fragile and conflict-affected states across 104 evaluated projects — the lowest of all Global Practices in FCS. MTI manages \$88.0 billion in global IDA/IBRD commitments since 2015, of which \$61.5 billion — 81.5 percent — went to projects rated below Satisfactory by IEG. In FCS: \$12.2 billion committed, \$8.5 billion below standard.

These numbers are from the IEG Master Database March 2026, covering 3,507 deduplicated projects rated since FY2015. They supersede any earlier figures from the February 2026 analytical series, which used a different dataset and time window.

### CENTRAL FINDING

MTI has the worst outcomes of any Global Practice at scale: 18.5% Satisfactory globally, 13.5% in FCS. \$61.5 billion of \$88.0 billion committed globally went to projects rated below Satisfactory. The appointment of an economist Country Director is the single most consequential portfolio policy decision the Bank makes. It is made without disclosure, without diversity criteria, and without accountability to outcome performance.

# Part I: Institutional Power Architecture

## 1. The Economist Pipeline: Career Architecture and Institutional Capture

The World Bank does not have a policy that economists must run country programs. It has something more durable: a career architecture that systematically advantages economists at every node of the progression from entry to Country Director, producing an outcome that looks like deliberate policy but requires no formal directive to perpetuate itself.

Stage 1 — Young Professional Entry: the YP program has historically drawn 40–50 percent of its cohort from economics disciplines. Stage 2 — Country Economist: the highest-status technical position in the CMU, definitionally an economist's post, producing the most valuable career capital in the institution — a direct, senior relationship with the Finance Minister that no other staff role replicates. Stage 3 — Program Leader: CMU-embedded, gatekeeper to the Country Partnership Framework, predominantly filled by economist-track staff. Stage 4 — Country Director: by the time the selection pool is assembled, it has been pre-filtered through three stages of economist advantage. Approximately 50 percent of substantive Country Director tenures across eight major Africa CMUs from 2000 to 2023 were held by core macroeconomist-track individuals. A further 20 percent were economists who moved into sector work. Fewer than 30 percent were trained in disciplines other than economics.

**Figure 1. The Economist Career Pipeline: From Entry to Institutional Control**

Career Stage	Core Function	Economist-Track Advantage
Young Professional (YP)	Competitive cohort entry	Economists ~40–50% of cohort historically; selection criteria calibrated for economics publication records
Country Economist / Analyst	Country economic analysis; Finance Ministry dialogue	Produces CEM, fiscal notes — core MTI product; builds the Finance Minister relationship no other role replicates
Program Leader (CMU-embedded)	Shapes CPF priorities; gates GP access to lending envelope	Predominantly economist track; gatekeeper to country pipeline; CMU intellectual frame is macro-fiscal
Country Director	Controls CPF, CMU budget, GP access, government letters	~50% core economist background in Africa CMU series; primary determinant of DPO vs. investment mix
<b>MTI Practice Manager</b>	Controls DPO pipeline — highest committed \$/operation of any GP	DPO instrument exclusively owned by MTI; \$87.0bn globally, \$60.6bn below standard (IEG FY2015–2026)

## 2. Portfolio Distortion: The MTI Inversion

If lending allocations reflected country need and comparative advantage, Global Practices delivering consistent results would receive more funding over time. The IEG data show the opposite: MTI has the lowest Satisfactory rate of any GP at scale — 18.5 percent globally, 13.5 percent in FCS — while managing the largest committed volumes through the DPO instrument. This inversion has no rational development explanation. The full GP comparison is in Figure 2 below, using verified IEG numbers across all evaluated projects FY2015–2026.

**Figure 2. Global Practice Portfolio: Verified IEG Outcome Rates FY2015–2026**

Global Practice	Global N	Global S%	Global \$bn	FCS N	FCS S%	FCS \$bn	FCS Fail \$
<b>MTI (Macro, Trade &amp; Investment)</b>	481	18.5%	\$88.0bn	104	13.5%	\$12.2bn	\$8.5bn
Governance	195	25.1%	\$14.8bn	56	19.6%	\$2.6bn	\$1.9bn
Transport	312	29.8%	\$59.1bn	47	14.9%	\$6.8bn	\$5.9bn
Water	271	29.9%	\$28.6bn	32	21.9%	\$3.0bn	\$2.3bn
Finance, Competitiveness (FCI)	213	37.1%	\$28.6bn	47	21.3%	\$2.5bn	\$1.7bn
Energy & Extractives	313	36.7%	\$62.4bn	64	28.1%	\$4.6bn	\$3.5bn
Agriculture & Food	291	37.8%	\$23.4bn	60	36.7%	\$3.8bn	\$2.3bn
Urban, Resilience & Land	401	40.9%	\$40.8bn	72	31.9%	\$3.4bn	\$2.2bn
Education	270	40.0%	\$26.7bn	54	33.3%	\$2.9bn	\$2.1bn
Health, Nutrition & Population	201	39.3%	\$21.9bn	48	35.4%	\$4.8bn	\$3.1bn
Social Protection & Jobs	183	53.6%	\$32.5bn	47	46.8%	\$7.1bn	\$4.7bn

Source: IEG Master Database March 2026, FY2015–2026, 3,507 deduplicated projects. All figures verified from database. FCS = Fragile and Conflict-Affected States classification. Fail \$ = committed to below-Satisfactory projects.

**CRITICAL FINDING**

*MTI has the lowest Satisfactory rate of any Global Practice at meaningful scale — 18.5% globally, 13.5% in FCS. \$61.5 billion of \$88.0 billion committed globally went to below-Satisfactory projects. Every dollar committed to MTI's DPO programme above the level justified by comparative advantage is a dollar not committed to sectors where the Bank has genuine operational expertise and measurable development impact.*

**3. The DPO Instrument: Scale and Performance**

Development Policy Operations are the primary vehicle through which MTI dominates the portfolio. The IEG data on DPF performance makes the scale of the problem precise.

**Figure 3. DPF (DPO) Instrument Performance — Verified IEG Data FY2015–2026**

DPF Subset	N Projects	S Rate	Committed	\$ Below Standard
All DPF globally	681	27.5%	\$145.6bn	\$88.0bn
DPF in FCS countries	108	13.0%	\$12.2bn	\$8.5bn
<b>MTI-managed DPF globally</b>	444	18.2%	\$87.0bn	\$60.6bn
<b>MTI-managed DPF in FCS</b>	98	13.3%	\$11.8bn	\$8.1bn

Source: IEG Master Database March 2026, FY2015–2026. MTI-managed = Global Practice listed as Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment.

Three institutional features make DPOs attractive regardless of development impact. Speed: a DPO can be prepared and approved in under six months versus two to four years for an investment project. Cost of failure: when a DPO fails, the failure is diffuse and deniable — conditions are framed in process terms, attribution is difficult. GP exclusivity: DPOs are by definition macro-fiscal instruments belonging to MTI. The instrument architecture protects GP market share.

### The Conditionality Circularity

The Letter of Development Policy required for DPO approval is rarely spontaneous. It is the product of policy dialogue in which the Bank's Country Economist and Program Leader shaped the reform agenda the government will endorse. The Bank defines the policy agenda; the government endorses it; the Bank lends against it. This circularity severs the feedback loop between policy design and implementation: the entity that produced the prior action language is not an independent verifier of whether the condition has been met.

## 3.2 Prior Actions as Institutional Theatre: Evidence from the DPO Record

The DPO paper published on mdbreform.com — Policy Without Performance: Isomorphic Mimicry and the DPO Incentive Trap (March 2026) — provides the empirical foundation for the conditionality circularity argument above. Based on IEG's database of 1,551 evaluated DPF operations and the DPAD Prior Actions Database of 11,628 prior actions (FY2004–FY2024), it documents a specific mechanism: governments adopt the outward forms of reform — laws gazetted, portals launched, strategies approved — to trigger disbursements, while the underlying administrative capability to enforce those reforms remains absent or deteriorates. Institutional economists call this isomorphic mimicry. IEG calls it, more politely, 'prior actions that are not credible or deep enough to trigger change.'

Four country cases from that paper illustrate what this looks like in practice. They are not selected for severity — they are selected because the IEG documentation is unusually explicit about the mechanism.

### MALI: FIVE CONSECUTIVE UNSATISFACTORY RATINGS — THEN A SIXTH SERIES

*Between FY2007 and FY2011 the Bank approved five consecutive PRSC operations committing approximately \$292 million. All five were rated Unsatisfactory by IEG. IEG recommended a self-evaluation before any new series. The Bank discontinued the series — and immediately launched a replacement before the self-evaluation was completed. In the successor PRISGO series (FY2017/19), triggers that could not be met were redesigned as weaker triggers to preserve the disbursement relationship. IEG: 'Development policy operations that do not carefully reflect on the experiences of similar previous initiatives can easily fall into the trap of repeating earlier mistakes.' Cumulative commitment exceeding \$400 million. Every evaluated operation after FY2006: Unsatisfactory or Moderately Unsatisfactory.*

### MOZAMBIQUE: BEGUILLED BY THE HEADLINE NUMBERS

*Three consecutive PRSC operations (FY2014–16) were rated Unsatisfactory — all following the standard MTI template of investment climate reform, PFM strengthening, and private sector development. IEG: 'It is easy to be beguiled by strong country economic performance and assume that policy integrity exists where it might not. Caution is called for before basing programme design and policy actions on Doing Business indicators.' What the prior actions missed: Mozambique's government had contracted approximately \$2 billion in undisclosed sovereign-backed debt through state-owned enterprises — the precise SOE governance problem IEG identified as the actual risk — while the Bank was measuring how many days it took to start a business.*

### **MALAWI: LENDING FOR HIPC ELIGIBILITY, NOT REFORM**

*IEG on the Fiscal Restructuring and Deregulation Programme: 'Incentives within the Bank can motivate unwise lending. The desire to transfer resources and establish HIPC eligibility were important motivations to the initiation of FRDP III. Despite the poor macroeconomic climate and lack of reform progress under the previous credits, FRDP III was enlarged by \$5 million.' The 2013 Malawi Economic Recovery DPO was rated Unsatisfactory in the context of the Cashgate public finance scandal — a systemic breakdown in the PFM systems that DPF operations had been designed to strengthen for fifteen years. IEG: 'There are immense risks linked to a partial reform syndrome, a situation where governments undertake reforms at a superficial level, and produce the form but not the substance of modernized institutions.' The lesson had been available since 1999.*

### **UGANDA PRSC 1–7: WHEN DISBURSEMENT BECOMES THE PRODUCT**

*The Uganda PRSC series (\$1.1 billion, seven operations) ended with three consecutive Moderately Unsatisfactory ratings. IEG: 'The PRSCs constituted an effective mechanism to transfer resources to Government and to support its budget. There is less clarity, though, as to whether the PRSCs constituted an effective tool to produce development results. If the PRSCs become a de facto instrument to transfer resources with conditionality becoming secondary to the relationship, this is problematic.' The Uganda Financial Sector DPL (FY2011) repeated the pattern eleven years later. The IEG lesson was already in the institutional record. It was not applied.*

The CPIA data provides the independent, country-level confirmation that these cases are systemic rather than exceptional. The Sub-Saharan Africa CPIA score was 3.1 in 2006. It was 3.1 in 2024. Eighteen years of DPF conditionality. Zero net aggregate movement.

The Doing Business index, which formed the evidentiary basis for investment climate prior actions across a decade of MTI-designed DPOs, was discontinued in 2021 after internal methodology deficiencies were found — retroactively invalidating the verification basis for hundreds of prior actions that had been certified as complied with. The prior actions were real. The reforms they were supposed to measure were not.

### **THE PATTERN IN ONE SENTENCE**

In Mali, Mozambique, Malawi, and Uganda — and documented in dozens of intermediate operations across the 20-year IEG record — the same pattern appears: governments produce the form of reform to trigger disbursement; the Bank certifies compliance; the money moves; the sovereign guarantee ensures repayment; and five years later IEG documents that the functional reform never happened. The institutional term for the specialist who raises concerns about this cycle before it is approved is 'roadblock.' There is no institutional term for the MTI Practice Manager whose FCS portfolio records 13.5 percent Satisfactory across a decade of lending — because there is no consequence to name.

## **4. The CMU as Battleground**

The CMU controls three critical resources that every Global Practice needs: access to the lending envelope; inclusion in the Country Partnership Framework; and government relationship capital. The implicit currency of CMU access is the macro-fiscal narrative. The 2022 IEG Global Footprint evaluation documents this directly: 84 percent of field-based TTLs reported that physical presence in the CMU country helps develop new business, versus 31 percent of Washington-based TTLs. The

competitive advantage flows to GPs whose staff are present and whose intellectual framework is aligned with the Country Director's.

## Part II: Cross-Cutting Empirical Findings

The full country-by-country evidence — all eight countries, all Country Director tenures — is in Annex A. This section presents the seven cross-cutting findings from the complete dataset. Background classification: E = Core Economist (PhD/MA economics, PREM/MTI career); SE = Sector Economist (economics degree, sector career); NE = Non-Economist (engineer, lawyer, accountant, public health, agriculture, social science).

### FINDING 1: MACROECONOMIST CDS CONSISTENTLY DELIVER 1.5–2X MORE DPO FINANCING

*Across all eight countries, Country Directors with primary training in macroeconomics and PREM-rooted careers consistently allocated 45–65 percent of the country lending envelope to DPOs. Country Directors from engineering, health, agriculture, or governance backgrounds allocated 8–25 percent. The differential is stable across countries, time periods, and macro environments — it reflects CD professional identity, not country-specific factors.*

### FINDING 2: THE PREM PIPELINE AS A DPO FACTORY

*A consistent career trajectory — Country Economist, Lead Economist, Sector Manager in PREM/MTI, Country Director — predicts DPO shares of 40–65 percent reliably. Ishac Diwan (Ethiopia 55–60%, Ghana 50–55%), Judy O'Connor (Tanzania 60%), Colin Bruce (Kenya 45–50%), and Shubham Chaudhuri (Nigeria 41% including \$1.5bn COVID DPO) all demonstrate this pattern.*

### FINDING 3: INFRASTRUCTURE AND SECTOR CDS CREATE DPO DESERTS

*Country Directors from engineering, infrastructure, health, and agriculture backgrounds consistently allocate 8–25 percent to DPOs. Paul Nounba Um (South Africa, PhD Engineering): near-zero. Henry Kerali (Ghana, PhD Civil Engineering): 12%. Eustache Ouayoro (DRC, engineer): 15%. Ousmane Dione (Ethiopia, MSc Civil Engineering): 12%. Nathan Belete (Senegal, MSc Agricultural Engineering): 16% — the lowest DPO share in the Senegal series after 25 years of economist-dominated leadership.*

### FINDING 4: CRISIS EVENTS OVERRIDE BACKGROUND — BUT ONLY BRIEFLY

*The 2008–09 crisis, the 2014–15 commodity shock, and COVID-19 drove temporary DPO spikes across all background types. Non-economist CDs return rapidly to investment-project dominance once the crisis passes. Economist CDs use crisis-era DPOs as a foundation for expanded programmatic budget support. Pierre Laporte's use of Ghana's COVID DPO (\$100m, 2020) as an entry point for the 2022–23 Economic Recovery DPO series (\$250m/year) is a textbook example.*

### FINDING 5: THE MARIE-NELLY NATURAL EXPERIMENT

*Marie Françoise Marie-Nelly served as Country Director in DRC (2008–11), Nigeria (2011–15), and South Africa (2019–23). In each case she pushed for significant budget support programmes regardless of country context, government counterparts, or macro environment. This cross-country*

*consistency is near-experimental evidence that professional identity — not country context — is the primary determinant of DPO intensity. The same person. Different countries. Same instrument preference.*

**FINDING 6: THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP IN DPO DESIGN**

*High-DPO tenures correlate with periods where prior action compliance is least scrutinised in Implementation Completion Reports. The ICR documentation for Nigeria's ERGC series, Tanzania's PRSC series, and Ethiopia's PBS programme all show prior actions described as 'complied with' based on government letter confirmation rather than independent verification.*

**FINDING 7: THE GHANA ACCOUNTABILITY FAILURE**

*Henry Kerali (PhD Civil Engineering) and Pierre Laporte (PhD Economics, IMF-background) held the same Ghana CD position consecutively. DPO share: 12% under Kerali, 43% under Laporte. The outcome — Ghana's 2022–23 debt distress, directly linked to a fiscal framework the Bank's DPO programme had endorsed — is the most consequential accountability failure in this series.*

**Figure 4. CD Background Category vs. DPO Orientation: Cross-Country Summary**

CD Background	Examples	Typical DPO Share	IEG Outcome Tendency
Macroeconomist / PREM (E)	Ghanem, Diwan, O'Connor, Chaudhuri, Laporte, Adams, Ayub	50–65%	MU elevated; prior action compliance weak; ICR ratings poor in FCS
Governance / Public Sector (NE)	Benmessaoud, Ndiaye, Carret, Dongier	25–40%	MS — higher conditionality enforcement; better prior action compliance
Infrastructure / Engineering (NE)	Kerali, Noumba Um, Ouayoro, Dione, Belete	8–25%	MS — investment outcomes stronger; infrastructure delivery traceable
Education / Health / Social (NE)	Kagia, Bird, Warwick, Reinikka, Hansen, Gaye	8–20%	MS — human development outcomes measurable; accountability clearer

## Part III: Accountability Gaps and Structural Reform

### 5. Why the Pattern Persists

Three structural reasons explain why the DPO-background correlation has persisted for 25 years despite being visible in IEG evaluation data throughout. First: appointment as de facto portfolio policy — the choice of Country Director determines whether 20 or 60 percent of IDA allocations flow through budget support, made without disclosure or accountability to outcomes. Second: the conditionality enforcement gap — economist CDs operate in a policy dialogue paradigm where prior actions signal reform intent rather than verified implementation. Third: the structural incentive problem — DPOs are faster, cheaper, and produce Finance Ministry relationships that generate institutional political capital. The instrument that generates the least development value per dollar most efficiently protects the institutional position of the GP that produces it.

## 6. Five Structural Reform Recommendations

### Recommendation 1 — Transparent Portfolio Instrument Justification

Country Partnership Frameworks should explicitly justify the DPO versus investment project split with reference to governance assessment, prior action verification capacity, and IEG outcomes from the previous CPF. This justification should be publicly disclosed and subject to IEG review.

### Recommendation 2 — Background Disclosure and Diversity in CD Appointments

The Bank should disclose the professional background of Country Directors at appointment. No country should have more than two consecutive economist-track CDs. No more than 50 percent of CD appointments across any three-year cohort should come from economics.

### Recommendation 3 — Prior Action Verification Standards

In countries rated below 3.5 on the CPIA, prior action compliance should require independent third-party verification, not government letter confirmation. DPO tranches should be suspended — not waived — when compliance cannot be independently verified.

### Recommendation 4 — Portfolio Balance Trigger

Any country portfolio where DPOs exceed 50 percent of total IDA/IBRD commitments over a rolling three-year period should trigger an automatic IEG rapid review. The Ghana and Nigeria experiences — DPO shares exceeding 40 percent immediately before macro deterioration — suggest this threshold could function as an early warning mechanism.

### Recommendation 5 — Restructure the MTI Global Practice

MTI's DPO function should be fundamentally restructured. Country-level macro policy dialogue should be reconstituted as a small analytics unit within each CMU — a support function, not a lending GP. Pure macro-fiscal DPOs should require co-sponsorship from a sector GP and independent verification of all prior actions before disbursement.

#### THE IMF CAPACITY ARGUMENT

The restructuring of MTI's macro-fiscal mandate is not a capacity vacuum. The IMF maintains full macro-fiscal engagement architecture in every major IDA borrowing country: the Article IV consultation, the Resident Representative, the FAD fiscal advisory mission, the TADAT revenue administration assessment, the Debt Sustainability Analysis. These are instruments purpose-built for exactly the macro-fiscal policy dialogue that MTI's DPO programme attempts to replicate. The 1944 Bretton Woods division of labour assigned this mandate to the Fund; the World Bank's comparative advantage was long-term development investment, sectoral expertise, and operational implementation that the IMF cannot replicate. The MTI Global Practice has spent thirty years reconstructing, within the World Bank, a macro-fiscal apparatus that competes with — and frequently contradicts — the institution that holds the primary mandate for this work.

The companion paper on this platform — *Parallel Bureaucracies, Conflicted Governments, Wasted Billions: The Fiscal and Governance Case for Ending IMF–World Bank Mandate Duplication* (mdbreform.com, March 2026) — documents the institutional and financial cost of this parallelism in detail. The finding is specific: both institutions condition financing on fiscal reforms simultaneously, produce parallel macroeconomic frameworks for the same country in the same year, maintain resident dialogue structures with the same Finance Ministers, and dispatch technical assistance missions to the same treasury departments with different reform priorities and different

timetables. The combined administrative cost of the duplication is conservatively estimated at \$750 million to \$1.1 billion per year.

Five documented country cases in that paper show the operational consequence: Nigeria (contradictory signals on fuel subsidy reform for six years; fiscal cost reached ₦4.4 trillion by 2022); Ghana (Bank DPO implicitly validated the fiscal trajectory that the IMF's own DSA had flagged as high-risk; debt distress materialized in 2022); Ethiopia (Finance Ministry acknowledged 'conflicting timetables from our two major macro partners'); Bangladesh (central bank staff described 'managing two reform frameworks simultaneously'); Pakistan (Ministry of Energy officials described the coordination burden as 'a second full-time job for our team').

The Malan Report (2007) identified 'a fundamental failure of collaboration' between the IMF and the World Bank at country level, documented 14 specific domains of overlapping mandate engagement with country-level harm, and was endorsed by both institutions — which then made no structural changes to staffing or lending architecture. The 2023 IMF-World Bank Collaboration Framework repeats coordination language from the 2007 concordat almost verbatim. Eighteen years of enhanced coordination have produced no measurable reduction in field-level duplication.

#### THE REFORM IMPLICATION

*If MTT's macro-fiscal lending function is restructured — as Recommendation 5 proposes — the Bank does not lose macro capacity. It recognises that macro capacity already exists in the institution designed to hold it. The World Bank's Country Economist retains an analytical and coordinating function. The IMF Resident Representative and Article IV mission retain the primary reform dialogue mandate. The DPO instrument is refocused on sectoral reform where the Bank has genuine operational expertise the Fund cannot replicate. The duplication cost — \$750M to \$1.1bn per year — is redirected to the investment operations that actually produce the development outcomes the macro DPOs are designed to enable but consistently fail to deliver. See: *Parallel Bureaucracies, Conflicted Governments, Wasted Billions* — [mdbreform.com/imf-world-bank-mandate-duplication/](https://mdbreform.com/imf-world-bank-mandate-duplication/)*

## 7. Priority Follow-On: Country Director CV Analysis at Scale

### 7. Priority Follow-On: Country Director CV Analysis at Scale

The hypothesis that Country Directors are drawn overwhelmingly from the economist track currently rests on practitioner knowledge and institutional observation across eight countries. Systematic CV analysis of approximately 100 active Country Director positions — using publicly available World Bank biography data and LinkedIn profiles — is achievable within 4–6 weeks and would constitute the most methodologically robust institutional accountability study the Bank has ever conducted on its own leadership pipeline.

## 8. Data Sources and Methodological Note

All GP outcome data in this report are from the IEG Master Database March 2026, covering 3,507 deduplicated projects rated FY2015–2026. These numbers supersede earlier figures from the February 2026 analytical series, which used a different dataset (Zenodo 10.5281/zenodo.19352303, IDA countries only, FY2015–2025). The two datasets differ in scope, deduplication methodology, and time window; where they conflict, this report uses the IEG Master Database figures. DPO share estimates for country tenures are approximations based on the World Bank's lending database, rounded to the nearest 5 percentage points.

This analysis was prepared by mdbreform.com and draws on the author's operational experience at OPCS and in various CMU's across Africa between 2003 to 2023.

## Annex A: Country Director Profiles and DPO Patterns by Country

All eight country tables follow. Background classification: E = Core Economist (red shading); SE = Sector Economist; NE = Non-Economist. DPO share = estimated % of total approved IDA/IBRD commitment during tenure allocated to Development Policy Operations. Sources: World Bank Projects and Operations database; IEG ICRR and CLRR ratings; World Bank public staff biographies; IEG 2022 Global Footprint evaluation; IEG 2021 Development Policy Financing Retrospective.

### A1. Nigeria

Nigeria is the largest IDA borrower in Africa. Chaudhuri's \$1.5 billion COVID DPO (2021) is the largest single DPO in Nigeria's history.

CD Name	Tenure	Type	Specialisation	DPO Profile	Share Est.
Edwin R. Lim	Jul 1990–Feb 1994	E	Macroeconomics	VERY LOW — military rule, Abacha sanctions; no budget support possible	~0%
Joanne Salop / Olivier LaFourcade	Mar 1994–May 1996	E	Macro / Country Economics	NEAR ZERO — sanctions regime; transitional period	~0%
Yaw Ansu	Feb 1997–Jun 2000	E	Structural Adjustment / Macro	TRANSITIONAL — post-1999 elections; early budget support preparation	~10–15%
Mark D. Tomlinson	Jul 2000–Jul 2004	NE	Infrastructure / Sector Lending	MODERATE — infrastructure orientation held DPO share down	~20%
Hafez M.H. Ghanem	Jul 2004–Jun 2007	E	Macroeconomics / Fiscal Policy	HIGH — Nigeria ERGC Series I–III (~\$800m each); fiscal reform dominant	~45–50%
Onno Ruhl	Mar 2008–Aug 2011	E	Macroeconomics / Country Economics	MODERATE — State Accountability \$200m; Fiscal Governance DPL series	~28–32%
Marie Françoise Marie-Nelly	Sep 2011–Jun 2015	NE	CPA; Commerce; Public Finance/Energy	MODERATE — Fiscal Consolidation DPL \$500m; health/education investment dominant	~22%
Rachid Benmessaoud	Oct 2015–Jun 2019	NE	Electrical Engineering; MBA; Governance	LOW-MODERATE — Fiscal Transparency DPO \$750m; power sector dominant	~18%
Shubham Chaudhuri	Oct 2019–Dec 2023	E	PhD Economics Princeton; MTI Practice Mgr	VERY HIGH — COVID DPO \$1.5bn (largest in Nigeria history); state-level fiscal DPOs	~41%

Note: DPO share = estimated % of total approved IDA/IBRD commitment during tenure.

### A2. South Africa

Marie-Nelly's return tenure (2019–23) provides a natural experiment: the same individual's DPO preference is transported across three entirely different countries.

CD Name	Tenure	Type	Specialisation	DPO Profile	Share Est.
Pamela Cox	Sep 1996–May 2000	E	PhD Economics Yale; PREM career	MODERATE — post-apartheid TA + limited budget support	~15%
Ritva S. Reinikka	Aug 2004–Feb 2008	SE	PhD Economics Helsinki; education/PSD	LOW — service delivery focus; DPO near-absent	~10%
Ruth Kagia	Aug 2008–Jun 2012	NE	Education specialist; Human Development career	VERY LOW — education background; no meaningful DPOs	~8%
Asad Alam	Jul 2012–Jun 2015	E	PhD Economics; PREM/Poverty career	MODERATE — macro orientation introduced; Economic Policy Loan prep	~20–25%
Guang Zhe Chen	Jul 2015–Oct 2016	SE	BA+MA Economics Harvard; Water/Infrastructure	MINIMAL — brief tenure; infrastructure orientation	~5%
Paul Noumba Um	Feb 2017–Jun 2019	NE	PhD Engineering/Economics; infrastructure/PPP	NEAR ZERO — infrastructure PPP focus; lowest DPO share in SA series	~5%
Marie Françoise Marie-Nelly	Sep 2019–Dec 2023	NE	CPA; Commerce; Public Finance/Energy	HIGH — COVID Fiscal Mgmt DPO \$750m; Competitiveness DPO series	~30–35%

### A3. Ethiopia

The Diwan-to-Ohashi-to-Chen-to-Dione trajectory maps almost perfectly onto the disciplinary transition from pure macro-economist to engineer — a 25-year gradient within a single country.

CD Name	Tenure	Type	Specialisation	DPO Profile	Share Est.
Ishac Diwan	Jan 2002–Feb 2007	E	PhD Economics UC Berkeley; academic macro	VERY HIGH — Ethiopia PRSC I–IV; Protection of Basic Services; principal DPO architect	~55–60%
Kenichi Ohashi	Aug 2007–Jul 2011	SE	Private Sector Dev; IFC background	MODERATE — PRSC V–VII (inherited); PBS maintained; DPO initiation reduced	~40%
Guang Zhe Chen	Dec 2011–Aug 2015	SE	BA+MA Economics; Water/Infrastructure career	LOW-MODERATE — infrastructure orientation growing; PBS IV continued	~25–30%
Carolyn Turk	Dec 2015–Jun 2020	SE	BA+MPhil Economics Cambridge; DFID/poverty lens	MODERATE — Inclusive Growth DPO series; social protection lens	~30%
Ousmane Dione	Jul 2020–Dec 2023	NE	MSc Civil Engineering; Water/Sanitation career	LOW — infrastructure focus; Tigray conflict disrupted portfolio	~12%

### A4. Kenya

The Gaye-to-Jaramillo oscillation — investment project portfolio rebuilt over five years, DPO intensity restored within 18 months — is the clearest evidence that instrument allocation tracks the CD, not the country.

CD Name	Tenure	Type	Specialisation	DPO Profile	Share Est.
Makhtar Diop	Oct 2001–Apr 2005	E	PhD Economics Paris; PREM/fiscal career	MODERATE-HIGH — Kenya PRSC I–II; Public Sector Reform Credit	~35–40%
Colin Bruce	May 2005–Jun 2008	E	Economist; PREM/trade career	HIGH — Kenya PRSC III–V; Trade and Competition DPO	~45–50%
Johannes Zutt	Jan 2009–Apr 2013	E	Macro/Country Economist; PREM career	HIGH — Kenya Financial & Private Sector DPL \$200m; Vision 2030 DPLs	~50%
Diarietou Gaye	May 2013–Jun 2018	NE	PhD Public Health/Nutrition; governance focus	MODERATE — Devolution DPO; Water Sector DPO; human capital dominant	~35%
Carlos Felipe Jaramillo	Jul 2018–Jun 2020	E	PhD Economics Purdue; macro/fiscal career	MODERATE-HIGH — Kenya Economic & Fiscal Resilience DPO \$750m	~38%
Keith Hansen	Sep 2020–Dec 2023	NE	BA Pol Sci Yale; MPA Princeton; JD Stanford; VP Human Dev	LOW — COVID ERT DPO emergency only; health/education investment dominant	~16%

## A5. Tanzania

Tanzania hosts the most extreme DPO case: O'Connor at 60% DPO share, declining to Bird and Warwick at 14–15% — a 45-percentage-point swing driven entirely by disciplinary background over 25 years.

CD Name	Tenure	Type	Specialisation	DPO Profile	Share Est.
James W. Adams	Jul 1996–Mar 2002	E	PhD Economics Harvard; PREM macro; later VP Operations	HIGH — Tanzania PRSC I–III; established DPO-dominant model	~50%
Judy M. O'Connor	May 2002–Jun 2007	E	Macro/Governance economist; strong DPO advocate	VERY HIGH — Tanzania PRSC IV–VIII; highest DPO share in Tanzania series	~60%
John McIntire	Jul 2007–Jul 2011	SE	PhD Agricultural Economics Purdue	MODERATE — PRSC IX–X (diminishing); agri investment expanded	~35%
Philippe Dongier	Feb 2012–Jun 2015	NE	Community Development; Rural Livelihoods; Social Development	LOW-MODERATE — residual PRSCs; community/rural dev dominant	~20%
Bella Bird	Jul 2015–Feb 2020	NE	BA+MA Anthropology/Dev Studies Oxford; DFID/governance	LOW — social sectors and governance investment dominant	~15%
Mara Warwick	Feb 2020–Jul 2022	NE	BA Govt Cornell; MPA Harvard KSG; Social Protection/Poverty	LOW — COVID Emergency Recovery DPO programmatic; human capital dominant	~14%

## A6. Senegal

Nathan Belete (2019–22) reversed a 25-year pattern of economist-dominated Senegal leadership. His agricultural engineering background is exactly the type of non-economist profile the Bank's CD appointment process rarely produces.

CD Name	Tenure	Type	Specialisation	DPO Profile	Share Est.
Jean-Louis Sarbib	Sep 1994–Apr 1996	E	Economist; later VP Africa and VP Human Dev	HIGH — post-CFA devaluation structural adjustment; SAC series	~50%
Mahmood A. Ayub	Aug 1996–Sep 2000	E	MA+DPhil Economics Oxford; PREM/trade career	HIGH — Senegal SAC II–III; HIPC PRSCs; trade/fiscal reform dominant	~45%
John McIntire	Nov 2000–Jul 2004	SE	PhD Agricultural Economics Purdue	MODERATE — agriculture orientation moderated DPO share	~24%
Madani M. Tall	Aug 2004–Jun 2008	NE	PhD Urban Planning/Development Paris	MODERATE — Senegal PRSC I–II; DPO below economist-CD levels	~30%
Habib M. Fetini	Jan 2009–Nov 2011	E	PhD Economics; MENA macro background	MODERATE — Senegal PRSC III; Competitiveness DPO; short tenure	~35%
Vera Songwe	Nov 2011–Jun 2015	E	PhD Economics Northwestern; PREM/Africa; later UNECA	HIGH — Senegal PRSC IV–VI; Agribusiness DPO; Fiscal Mgmt DPL \$200m	~35%
Louise J. Cord	Jul 2015–Jun 2019	E	PhD Economics Tufts; PREM/Poverty career	MODERATE-HIGH — Governance & Growth DPO; Human Capital DPO	~31%
Nathan M. Belete	Aug 2019–Nov 2022	NE	MSc Agricultural Engineering; MBA; Agriculture/Rural Dev	LOW — COVID Emergency DPO limited; rural dev dominant	~16%

## A7. Ghana: The Kerali-Laporte Natural Experiment

Kerali vs. Laporte: same country, same counterparts, overlapping macro environments. DPO share 12% vs 43%. Outcome: debt distress. The most consequential accountability failure in the dataset.

CD Name	Tenure	Type	Specialisation	DPO Profile	Share Est.
Peter C. Harrold	Dec 1997–Jul 2002	E	Macro/Country Economist; Africa PREM; structural adjustment	HIGH — Ghana SAC III; PRSC I–II; HIPC DPO; adjustment lending dominant	~50%
Mats Karlsson	Nov 2002–Jun 2007	NE	Political Science; Sida/Swedish MFA; aid effectiveness	MODERATE — Ghana PRSC III–V; Private Sector DPO	~35%
Ishac Diwan	Nov 2007–Feb 2012	E	PhD Economics UC Berkeley; academic macro	HIGH — Ghana PRSC VI–IX; Petroleum Revenue Mgmt DPO \$100m	~50–55%
Yusupha B. Crookes	Mar 2012–Jun 2015	SE	Economics; Governance; IFC background	MODERATE — Ghana Economic Mgmt DPO \$100m; fiscal crisis context	~35–40%
Henry G.R. Kerali	Jul 2015–Jun 2019	NE	BSc Civil Eng Makerere; PhD	NEAR ZERO — one residual operation; infrastructure	~12%

CD Name	Tenure	Type	Specialisation	DPO Profile	Share Est.
			Transport Eng Birmingham	dominant; lowest DPO share in Ghana series	
Pierre Frank Laporte	Jul 2019–Dec 2023	<b>E</b>	PhD Economics Paris I; IMF economist; WB Africa PREM	<b>VERY HIGH — COVID DPO \$100m entry; Economic Recovery DPO \$250m/year; Ghana ends in debt distress</b>	~43%

## A8. Democratic Republic of Congo

Pedro Alba initiated a PRSC series in DRC in 2005, three years after the end of a devastating civil war, in an environment where budget support accountability was structurally unverifiable.

CD Name	Tenure	Type	Specialisation	DPO Profile	Share Est.
Emmanuel Mbi	Nov 1998– Dec 2004	NE	Legal/Economist background; FCV management	VERY LOW — active conflict; emergency grants only	~5%
Pedro Alba	Feb 2005– Jun 2007	<b>E</b>	PhD Economics Boston University; PREM macro	MODERATE — DRC PRSC I (first post-conflict DPO); Economic Stabilisation Credit	~25%
Marie Françoise Marie-Nelly	Jan 2008– Aug 2011	NE	CPA; Commerce; Public Finance/Energy	<b>MODERATE-HIGH — DRC PRSC II–III; Governance Budget Support; HIPC Completion DPO</b>	~35%
Eustache Ouayoro	Sep 2011– Sep 2014	NE	Engineer; Infrastructure/Transport career	LOW — limited governance DPO only; STEP roads and energy dominant	~15%
Ahmadou Moustapha Ndiaye	Jan 2015–Apr 2018	NE	Financial Management Specialist; Governance/PFM career	MODERATE — DRC Human Capital DPO; Governance DPO series	~26%
Jean-Christophe Carret	Apr 2018–Jun 2022	SE	PhD Environmental Economics Paris; NR career	LOW-MODERATE — one or two governance/forest DPOs; COVID disruption	~19%
Albert G. Zeufack	Jul 2022–Dec 2023	<b>E</b>	PhD Economics; WB YP Research; Africa Chief Economist	MODERATE — DRC Economic Resilience DPO preparation; macro lens re-introduced	~31%